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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Federal Communications Commission's
("FCC" or the "Commission") purpose is to advance the interests of the American people in the
sphere of communications. In striving to achieve
*

Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth was nominated

by President Clinton and confirmed by the Senate Oct. 28,
1997 to be a Federal Communications Commission Commissioner. He was sworn in as a Commissioner on Nov. 3, 1997.
Previously, Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth served as the
Chief Economist for the U.S. House Committee on Commerce.
** Bryan N. Tramont serves as Legal Advisor to Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth at the FCC. Prior to his service at the
Commission, he practiced communications law at Wiley,
Rein, & Fielding in Washington, D.C.
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that goal, commissioners generally develop distinct regulatory philosophies to guide their consideration of agency proposals. Our regulatory
philosophy is grounded in some basic "first principles."'

their considerable editing skills to bear in assisting with the
completion of this article. Finally, the authors appreciate the
sharp intellect and editorial support of Dan Troy of Wiley,
Rein, & Fielding.
I These principles have been developed and refined over
time. See Harold Furchtgott-Roth, Regulation and Technology,

Remarks Before the New York Chapter of the Federal Communications Bar Association (visited Apr. 4, 2000) <www.fcc.
gov/Speeches/FurchtgottRoth/sphfr906.htm>; see also
Harold Furchtgott-Roth, Regulation in the 21st Century, Remarks Before KMB Video Conference (visited Apr. 4, 2000)
<www.fcc.gov/Speeches/FurchtgottRoth/sphfr905.html>;
American Enterprise Institute, The Realpolitik of Regulation: Offensive and Defensive Strategies (visited May 21, 2000) <www.fcc.
gov/Speeches/FurchtgottRoth/2000/sphfrO5.html>.
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First and foremost, a government agency such
as the FCC is obligated to follow the law as written. Absent adherence to this fundamental idea,
agencies lose the very core of their credibility and
authority. Proposed actions largely fall within one
of four categories under the "follow the law" principle. First, there are actions that are clearly mandated by the Communications Act of 19342 and
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (collectively the "Act"). For these actions, the Commission has very little burden to demonstrate the efficacy of its action. Congress has required us to act.
Second, there are cases where Congress has
granted the FCC authority to act, but action is not
mandatory. 4 In these cases, the Commission must
show its actions are reasonable. In the third category are proposed actions that have no clear foundation in the Act. Essentially the statutes are silent. For these cases, the agency faces a significant
burden to justify any action. The Commission
should be extremely reluctant to support policy
initiatives in the face of statutory silence. Finally,
in the fourth category are actions that a statute
forbids. 5 Obviously, agency action in these cases is
barred.
Where a proposed agency action falls within the
first of these categories, other factors become relevant. 6 The first group of questions to consider is
largely procedural: has the agency acted in a
transparent and accountable way? What is the nature of the record that supports government intervention? Will aggrieved parties have an opportunity to take us to court to ensure that the agency
has adhered to the law?
Aside from these procedural concerns, the
Commission should also examine at a macro level
whether regulatory intervention is necessary or
desirable. The FCC should intervene only when
other government agencies (federal, state or local) are inadequately addressing a problem. Basic
2 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(k), 157(b), 203,
204(a)(2)(A), 208(b), 209, 213(e), 215, 219(b), 220(a)(2),
224(b)(1), 225(b), 225(d), 227(b)(2), 227(c), 227(d)(2),
227(d)(3), 228(b), 228(c), 229 (a)-(c), 251(e)(1), 253(d),
254(a), 254(h)(2), 254(k), 255(b)(1), 256(b)(1),
257(a)-(c), 259(a)-(b), 260(b), 271(d)(3), 271(d)(6)(B),
275(b), 332(a), 332(c)(1)(C), 534(d)(2), 534(f), 534(g)(2);
see also Communications Act of 1934, Title I, ch. 652, 48 Stat.
1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-714).
3 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified at
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C).
4 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 213(a)-(c), 214(d), 218, 220(b),
302(a), 533(c), 549.
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principles of federalism suggest that, in many
cases, states and localities are better positioned to
solve public policy problems.
Finally, the Commission must assess whether
the regulatory resources spent on a given proposal could be more fruitfully deployed on other initiatives. Ultimately, the FCC's resources are a
zero-sum game. Resources taken for one proposal
mean resources taken away from others.
Of course, these principles are easier to state in
the abstract than they are to employ in Commission decision-making. Nonetheless, these principles should be brought to bear on FCC decisions.
Absent such guideposts, the agency may stumble
into policy arenas beyond its core competency
and central mission.
Unfortunately, the Commission frequently
strays from these principles. 7 These forays are
often motivated by the desire to reach out and
"do good"-to solve every perceived problem that
remotely affects telecommunications and social
policies. This well-intentioned approach has unfortunate and unintentional consequences. The
approach often disregards or aggressively and
inappropriately interprets the law. It may adopt
results-oriented procedures that deny parties viable legal recourse and thwart public participation.
It often advocates FCC action even when another
government entity or the marketplace is working
to resolve the issue. Furthermore, these excursions draw resources away from functions clearly
within the FCC's mandate. Paradoxically the "do
good" approach is often popularly received. New
initiatives get quite a bit of positive media attention, as the government appears to be "solving
problems." Ultimately, this approach may undermine the core mission and the effectiveness of the
agency itself.
Set out below is a case study of one Commission
action indicative of the "do good" approach to
5

See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 210, 221(b), 224(c) (1), 302(c),

332(c) (3) (B) (7) (A).
6 This is by no means an exhaustive list. Rather, this article highlights those principles most relevant.
7 See Testimony of FCC Comm'r Furchtgott-Roth Before
the House Committee on Commerce, Subcommittee on
Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection, The
Telecommunications Merger Review Act of 2000 (Mar. 14,
2000) <www.fcc.gov/Speeches/FurchtgottRoth/2000/sphfr

004.html>; see also Harold Furchtgott-Roth, The FCC Racket,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 5, 1999) <www.fcc.gov/Speeches/
FurchtgottRoth/fccRack.html>.
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FCC policy-making. We chose it not because it
shows a particularly egregious misstep by the
Commission, but somewhat the opposite. It shows
that, although the Commission has no clear responsibility in certain areas, the desire to "do
good" can push the agency to the edges of, and
beyond, its jurisdictional authority. This inexorably leads to procedural short cuts, diminished efforts by other government agencies, and diversion
of resources from more pressing and fundamental Commission activities. Thus, by attempting to
"do good," the agency may actually do harm.
The recent Joint FCC/FTC Policy Statement For the
Advertising of Dial-Around and Other Long-Distance
Services To Consumers ("FCC/FTCAdvertising Guidelines" or "Guidelines")" is ultimately designed to
protect consumers from allegedly misleading
statements and improper disclosures embodied in
certain advertisements for "dial-around" long-distance services. "Dial-around" services include "1010-XXX," which permits a customer to "dial
around" the pre-selected long-distance service
provider on a given telephone. 9 The Commission
staff and Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") staff
jointly developed the 18-page guidelines in an effort to determine which "dial-around" advertising
approaches are permissible and which are considered misleading.' 0 The FCC/FTCAdvertising Guidelines were released with much fanfare and positive
publicity on March 1, 2000.11
Generally speaking, the Guidelines establish basic principles that dial-around advertisers must
follow (i.e. truthfulness, disclosure, clarity and
conspicuousness) in an effort to put all carriers
on equal footing with respect to advertising practices. 12 These principles are supported by detailed
"factors" that the FCC considers in determining
whether to bring an enforcement action against
carriers who advertise in a "deceptive manner."' 3
For example, in determining whether an ad is
8 In reJoint FCC/FTC Policy Statement For the Advertising of Dial-Around and Other Long-Distance Services To
Consumers, Policy Statement, 15 FCC Rcd. 8654 (adopted by
the FCC: Feb. 29, 2000; adopted by the FTC, Feb. 23, 2000;

rel. Mar. 1, 2000) [hereinafter FCC/FTC Advertising Guidelines].
9 See id. at para. 3. "Pre-selected" in this circumstance
means the carrier that the consumer has chosen to be the

primary or "default" long-distance carrier for a particular
line.
10 See id. at para. 10.
11 See, e.g., Statement of FCC Chairman William E. Kennard on the Joint FCC/FTC Policy on Long-Distance/DialAround Advertising (visited May 21, 2000) <www.fcc.gov/

"conspicuous," the FCC considers the prominence of qualifying information, the proximity
and placement of this information, the absence of
distracting elements, and the clarity and under1
standability of the text of the disclosure. 4
Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth dissented from
the FCC/FTCAdvertising Guidelines for several reasons, each of which is discussed in detail below.
First, by endorsing the Guidelines, the FCC
failed to give proper weight to the "follow the law"
principle. In situations where enabling statutes
are silent regarding specific activities (the third
category discussed above), an agency should be
extremely reluctant to act. Because the Act is silent as to advertising regulation, parties advocating FCC action in this arena have a high burden
to show that the proposed regulations are justified. Here, based on our analysis of the Act and
reviewing courts' interpretation of the statutory
language, that burden has not been met. Second,
the Guidelines should have been developed in a
more open and transparent process that holds the
FCC accountable for the result. The Guidelines
were adopted without the benefit of a notice and
comment rulemaking and are therefore not readily subject to court review. Nonetheless, the Commission has made clear that parties disregard
5
these Guidelines at their own peril.1
Third, this initiative failed to take into account
the parallel actions of state government, as well as
the possible preemptive impact of the guidelines.
State efforts and consumer education in this area
may well be sufficient to reach the stated policy
goals of the Guidelines.'6
Fourth, there are other worthy projects at the
agency-including other consumer protection efforts well within the FCC's statutory chargewhich deserve full resources before funds are funneled to initiatives like the FCC/FTC Advertising
DailyReleases/DailyBusiness/2000/dbO301/stwek017.
html>.
12
See FCC/FTCAdvertising Guidelines, 15 FCC Rcd. 8654,

at para. 13-14.
13
14

15

Id. at para. 9.

Id. at para. 22.
Chairman Kennard asserts that "[t]he FCC stands

ready to take enforcement action against carriers that engage
in the kind of misleading practices described in the [Guidelines] ." Id.
16 Although the FCC has far less experience in the con-

sumer protection area than do states, once the Commission
has begun to occupy the field, states may be reluctant to act.
This topic is covered more fully in Part IV infra.
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Guidelines that lie at the edges of, or outside, the
FCC's jurisdiction.
Every policy-maker wishes to stop false and misleading advertising. Policy-makers must not, however, permit the desirability of the ends to short
change a rigorous analysis of the means.' 7 In this
regard, initiatives like the FCC/FTC Advertising
Guidelines are a dangerous trend at the Commission. The trend ultimately undermines the
agency's authority, short-circuits the legislative
process and harms consumers. An explicit consideration of the public policy principles set out below may not have changed the outcome of the
FCC/FTC Advertising Guidelines debate, but such
considerations at least would have made clear the
values and priorities of the agency. The public is
never ill served by such a debate.
II.

THE GUIDELINES' PRECARIOUS LEGAL
FOUNDATION

A. The "Follow the Law" Principle
The FCC should follow the law. At first blush,
this would not seem to be a particularly controversial proposition."' However, few concepts promote consumer welfare more than the willingness
of government agencies to humbly follow their legal authority and not exceed it. When agencies do
not follow the law, everyone loses. Predictability is
lost. Guiding principles become murky and malleable.
17
For a detailed discussion of the FCC using improper
means to achieve arguably popular ends in another context,
see Comm'r Furchtgott-Roth's Public Statement, Joint Application for a License to Land and Operate a Submarine Cable Network Between the United States and Japan (visited June 6, 2000)
<http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/FtirchtgottRoth/Statements/sthfr932.html>. See also Applications of Ameritech
Corp., Transferor, and SBC Communications, Inc., Transferee, For Consent to Transfer Control of Corporations
Holding Commission Licenses, 14 FCC Rcd. 14,712 (visited

June 9, 2000) <http://www.fee.gov/Speeches/Furchtgott_
Roth/Statements/sthfr949.html> (separate statement of
Comm'r Furchtgott-Roth).
Nonetheless, the Commission frequently has trouble
18
even with this basic principle. See GTE Service Corp. v. FCC,
205 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2000). In G7E Service Corp., Chief
Judge Edwards, looking to the guidance of AT&T Corp. v.

Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366 (1999), remanded the recent order from In re Deployment of Wireline Service Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability ("Collocation
Order"), First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 14 FCC Rcd. 4761 (1999), because the Commis-

sion did not follow the law. See GTE Service Corp., 205 F.3d at
427. The court found that the Commission's "interpretations
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Regulators are not legislators. If the law is imperfect, the legislators, not the regulators, must
correct it. If the law has obvious problems, legislators can and will fix it. An agency's legitimacy derives solely from following the law as written.
When the FCC goes beyond the law as written, it
tarnishes the law, reduces the law's legitimacy and
by extension, undermines the Commission's own
regulatory legitimacy. Agencies do not add anything by doing "good," no matter how tempting.
Congress defines the "good" that the FCC should
do. It is not for the Commission to direct social
policy, override Congress or to expand the
agency's jurisdiction to reach every perceived
problem.
Regulators do no one a favor by going beyond
the law or around it in an attempt to cure some
perceived defect. Agencies do not help the public
because the public looks to the legislature, not
regulators, to write law. The most effective way to
force a legislature to correct a bad law is to implement it as written. Independent agencies must
simply be implementers of the law-not advocates
for its change or advocates for exceeding the
law. ' 9

Predictability and trustworthiness allow markets
to flourish. Regulators do not create new technologies nor do they create new services. The FCC
does not create consumer benefits. Markets do all
of these things and more. 20 The Commission
should be a reluctant entrant into the market-

of 'necessary' and 'physical collocation' appear[ed] to diverge from any realistic meaning of the statute." Id. at 421 In
Bell Atlantic Telephone Co. v. FCC, 206 F.3d I (D.C. Cir. 2000),
Judge Williams vacated the Commissions ruling In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Intercarrier Compensation for
ISP-Bound Traffic, 14 FCC Rcd. 3689 (1999). The FCC had
held that calls to internet service providers could not be considered "local" for purposes of subjecting them to the reciprocal compensation requirement of the Act because such

calls are global in nature when considered "end to end." The
court held that the FCC had not given a proper justification

for why ISP calls that LECs terminate are not seen as "local
traffic" subject to reciprocal compensation under 47 U.S.C.
§ 251 (b) (5). See Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d at 5.
19 See In re Principles for Reallocation of Spectrum to Encourage the Development of Telecommunications Technologies for the New Millennium, 14 FCC Rcd. 19,868 (1999)
(separate statement of Comm'r Furchtgott-Roth).
See generally James C. Thomas, Fifty Years With the Ad20

ministrative Procedure Act and Judicial Review Remains an
Enigma, 32 TULSA L.J. 259 (1996) (describing the role of sep-

aration of powers in the context of the Administrative Procedure Act and the delegation doctrine) [hereinafter Thomas].
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place because regulators do not "do" anything. Indeed, the only jobs an agency creates are for
Washington lobbyists, retained to navigate the
hazardous shoals of its regulations. In the end,
the best that agencies can do to "help" markets is
to adhere to the law.
B.

Application: The FCC/FTCAdvertising
Guidelines

1.

The FC's Lack of Authority over Common
CarrierAdvertising

The Guidelines presented an interesting threshold legal question: before even addressing the
FCC's authority, why is the FTC not responsible as
the primary federal regulator of advertising practices? Most policy-makers-including the FCCwant to curtail practices that are confusing, misleading or even fraudulent. However, Congress
generally designated the FTC, not the FCC, as the
regulator of advertising. In this case, however,
that was not true.2 1 Despite its broad general mandate, the Federal Trade Commission lacks authority over advertising practices by certain industries,
including common carriers, under sections 45
and 46 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
("FTC Act").22 The statute expressly states that the
FTC is empowered to regulate advertising and
other commercial practices "except [for] banks

[those] subject to the Packers and Stockyards
23
Act."
These exceptions have been long recognized by
the courts as binding and unalterable. The lack of
authority under the exceptions to the FTC's mandate was described in 1920 in T.C. Hurst & Son v.
f TC.2 4 In Hurst, a delegation doctrine case, the
court reviewed the express language of the FTC
Act. 25 Citing the enabling statute extensively, the
court concluded "[b]anks and common carriers
were doubtless excepted from the act." 26 This notion was confirmed by the 1962 Supreme Court
antitrust case of U.S. v. Philadelphia National
Bank. 27 The Court in Philadelphia National Bank
cited Hurst, further affirming that the FTC's au2
thority is bounded by its statutory exceptions.
Cases involving common carriers, air carriers
and packers similarly confirm the FTC's lack of
statutory authority. Regarding common carriers,

FTC v. Miller29 held that the FFC could not enforce a subpoena against a common carrier due
to the statutory exemptions.3 11 In Miller, the FTC
attempted to investigate the advertising of interstate motor carriers.3 ' To assist in its investigation,
the FTC subpoenaed some of the carriers'
records.3 2 The subpoenas were opposed, and the
FTC sought enforcement in the district court.-" In
overturning the district court's ruling, the Sixth
Circuit cited the FTC statute's common carrier ex-

• .. common carriers . . . air carriers . . . and
21
See Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat.
717, §§ 5, 6 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 45,
46 (1994 & Supp. 1998)); see also Thomas, supra note 20, at
282 (noting that but for these exceptions, the general authority of the FTC in this area is quite broad).
However, it is clear that the FTC cannot act outside these
exceptions. See 32 FED. PROC. § 75:13 (1985); see also 32 FED.
PROC. § 75:47 (1985); DW 709 PLI/Cou' 205, 299 (listing
which agency, if any, is responsible for the exceptions to the
FTC Act); Jean Noonan, Federal Trade Commission Enforcement

Activities, 500 PLI/CoMM 283 (1989); 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopo-

lies, Restraints of Trade and Unfair Trade Practices§ 319 (1996);
Stephen Dempsey, Rate Regulation and Antitrust Immunity in
Transportation:the Genesis and Evolution of This Endangered Species, 32 Am. U. L. REV. 335 (1983) (describing the original

jurisdiction of the ICC); 10A FLETCHER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRIvATE CORP. § 5046 (1999) (describing authority for antitrust
enforcement).
22
Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717,
§§ 5, 6 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 45(a)(2), 46(a), 46(b) (1994 & Supp. 1998)). This enabling statute otherwise empowering the FTC clearly has exceptions regarding regulation of common carriers. See FTC v.
Miller, 549 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1977) (applying this exception
squarely to misleading advertising by common carriers).
23 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2).

268 F. 874 (E.D.Va. 1920).
The FTC Act then read "[t]he Commission is hereby
empowered ... except banks, and common carriers." Id. at
876 (citing Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717, Comp. St., §§ 8836a-8836k, Comp. St.
§ 8836e (1914)).
26
Id. at 877.
27
374 U.S. 321 (1962)
28
See id. at 335 n.11; accord Lorenzetti v. American Trust
Co., 45 F. Supp. 128, 134 (N.D. Cal. 1942) (stating "banks
were specifically exempted from the operation of the Federal
Trade Commission Act"); see also Carl Felsenfeld, The Bank
Holding Company Act: Has It Lived Its Life?, 38 VILL. L. REv. 1,
101 n. 493. (1993).
29
549 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1977).
30 See id. at 461. The court related Miller to the Supreme
Court case of Leedom, 358 U.S. 184 (1958) where the NLRB
was told not to act since its statutory authority did not reach
the intended parties. But see A&B Freight Lines, Inc. v. FTC,
1980 WL 1787 (D.D.C. 1980) (limiting the application of the
Leedom doctrine to situations where "unauthorized agency action would destroy a clear, specific statutory right not otherwise protected").
31 See Miller, 549 F.2d at 454.
32
See id.
24
25

33

See id.
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emption. 34 The court dismissed the FTC's asser-

tion that advertising by common carriers was a
non-common carrier activity and thus fell within
FTC control. 35 Despite the FTC's protests, the
court chose to allow these "carve outs" in FTC authority to persist.3 6 Interestingly, the case goes on
to describe the FTC's own failed efforts to have
the common carrier exception eliminated during
37
the 94th congressional session.

Other courts have reached similar results. Regarding air carriers, the Supreme Court indicated
in Nader v. Allegheny Airlines38 that jurisdiction for
consumer complaints resided with the states.3 9
Likewise, the packers and stockyard exception was
sustained in United Corp. v. FFC.4 0 In United, the
FTC attempted to limit the advertising of a meat
packer that identified its ham as a product of Virginia. 41 In rejecting the FTC's claim, the Fourth
Circuit looked directly to the packers exception in
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clearly stated that "[t]he Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41 et. seq. [sic], does not ap' 46
ply to telegraph companies and is not invoked."
In sum, it is clear that the FTC is precluded
from regulating common carrier advertising. The
language of the FTC's enabling statute is as plain
today as it was seventy years ago. In 1929, the Supreme Court in Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co.
47
v. Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks,
held that "[t]he definite prohibition of Congress
inserted in the act cannot therefore be overridden in the view that Congress intended it to be
ignored." 4 The prohibition could not be ignored

falls within the control of the Packers and Stockyard Act and related statutes, simply is not subject

in 1929. Nor should it be ignored today. The FTC
has no authority over common carrier advertising.
Of course, at some level, this conclusion begs
the question: why would Congress carve out certain industries from FTC regulation? 49 The answer appears to be that Congress originally created other agencies to regulate these industries.
Bankers were regulated by the SEC, packers by
the USDA, air carriers by the CAB and common

to FTC regulation.

carriers by the ICC. 50 Yet, Congress did not con-

the FTC Act. 42 The court held that a firm, which

43

Telecommunications common carriers have experienced similar results. For example, the court
in United States v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 44 in-

voked the common carrier statutory exception as
a ground for dismissal. 45 In preparation for laying
out the Sherman Act claims at issue, the court
See id. at 455.
See id. at 458. ("The regulatory approach articulated by
the Commission, while it may be a desirable one, is not the
one Congress appears to have adopted.").
36
See id. at 459 ("Congress' recognition of a regulatory
gap with respect to banks is implicitly a recognition of such a
gap with respect to common carriers as well.").
37 See id.
38
426 U.S. 290 (1976).
39
See id. at 292; accord American Airlines v. Platinum
World Travel, 769 F. Supp. 1203, 1205 (D. Utah 1990) (rejecting defendants' claim that the consumer complaint belonged with the FTC because 15 U.S.C. § 45 "specifically exempts air carriers"). Recently the FCC faced a Nader-type
request when Southwestern Bell Mobile Sys. petitioned the
agency to assert its primary jurisdiction over state law claims
in Smilow v. Southwestern Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., Civ. A. No.
97-10307-REK (D. Mass 1996). In the subsequent order, the
Commission declined to assert primary jurisdiction regarding
the state consumer fraud law claims. See In re Southwestern
Bell Mobile Sys., Inc. Petition for a Declaratory Ruling Regarding the Just and Reasonable Nature of, and State Challenges to, Rates Charged by CMRS Providers when Charging
for Incoming Calls and Charging for Calls in Whole Minute
Increments, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 FCC Rcd.
19,898, para. 10 (1999) [hereinafter Southwestern Bell Order].
40
110 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1940).
41
See id. at 474.
34
35

sistently give these agencies jurisdiction over advertising. For some common carrier regulators,
such as the FAA (successor to the CAB), their enabling statutes specifically contained provisions
about advertising. 5' For the purposes of this article, the key question is whether Congress ever
42
See id. at 475. ("It was doubtless because plenary power
over the unfair trade practices of packers had been vested in
the Secretary of Agriculture.").
43 See id. at 474; accord U.S. v. Purdue Farms, 680 F.2d
277, 284 n.6 (2d Cir. 1982) (relating a situation where, interestingly enough, Purdue wanted to be subject to FTC jurisdiction so it could avoid regulation by the Secretary of Agriculture).
44 53 F. Supp. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
45 See id. at 381.
46
Id.
47 281 U.S. 548 (1929).
48
Id. at 570.
49 See Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717,
719-721 (1914) (stating that the exception for common cariers was included in the original FTC Act); see also Peter C.
Ward, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: LAW PRACTICE, PROCEDURE § 3.05[2] (describing the exceptions to the FTC Act);
see also Stephanie W. Kanwit, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
§ 1.06, p. 1-19 (1995) (describing exceptions to the FTC
Act).
50
See 54A Am. JUR. 2d Monopolies, Restraints of Trade and
Unfair Trade Practices § 1232 (1996); see also 54 Am. JUR. 2d
Monopolies, Restraints of Trade and Unfair Trade Practices § 319
(1996).
51 See Nader,426 U.S. at 295 n.I I (citing Section 11 of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, subsequently codified at 49
U.S.C. §§ 1381, 1505). Many of these provisions have subse-
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granted advertising regulatory authority over telecommunications carriers to the FCC. 52 Despite

numerous amendments, the Communications Act
does not give the FCC any explicit authority over
advertising..
2.

The FCC's Tenuous Jurisdiction over Advertising
Under 47 U.S.C. § 201

The FCC/FTC Advertising Guidelines assert FCC
authority over advertising solely based on Section
201(b) of the Act.5 3 That section "requires that
common carriers' practices ... for and in connection with ... communication service, shall be just

and reasonable. '5 4 The FCC/FTCAdvertising Guidelines then contend that advertising qualifies as a
"practice" under the statute. 55 However, the plain
meaning of the term "practices" taken in the context of Section 201 clearly does not reach advertising. This is particularly true in light of Congress'
ability to craft explicit "advertising" jurisdiction
over common carrier services when its desires
such jurisdiction. For example, Congress has specifically granted the FTC jurisdiction over "adver56
tisement[s] for pay-per-call services."
In the end, if the Commission reads "practices"
to include advertising, it will be difficult to discern
what the term does not include. 57 For example,

are labor and employment policies of telephone
companies equivalent to "practices" under the
quently been eliminated due to airline deregulation. See also
Jonathan Blacker, Comment, 'fHy to London for $298": The Battle Between Federal and State Regulation of Airfare Advertising
Heats Up, 61 J. AIR. L. & COM. 205 (1995) (describing in Part
III the statutory history of airline regulation and deregulation, including the 1984 transfer of consumer protection du-

ties from the CAB to the DOT and warning of Federal preemption); Laynie Giles, Note, Interpreting the Airline
DeregulationAct of 1978: Federal Preemption Over State Deceptive
Advertising Laws, 22 TRANsp. L. J. 87 (1984); 54A AM. JUR. 2d
Monopolies, Restraints of Trade and Unfair Trade Practices§ 1232
(1996); 54 AM. JUR. 2d Monopolies, Restraints of Trade and Unfair Trade Practices§ 319 (1996).
52

Of course, jurisdiction over telecommunications prov-

iders passed from the ICC to the FCC long ago. See MannElkins Act, 36 Stat. 539 (1910) (giving the ICC regulatory authority over communications common carriers); see also PETER HUBER ET AL.,

FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS

LAW

16

(1999) (describing the Mann-Elkins Act); Scott Cooper, Technology and Competition Come to Telecommunications: Reexamining
Exemptions to the Federal Trade Commission Act, 49 ADMIN. L.
REv. 963 (1997) [hereinafter Cooper] (reviewing ICCjurisdiction over telecommunications granted through the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910 and its transfer to the FCC in the Communications Act of 1934).
53 See FCC/FTC Advertising Guidelines, supra note 8, at

Act? Could the Commission thus issue hiring
guidelines for common carriers? Is the use of energy efficient equipment a "practice"? Could the
Commission mandate use of certain fuel-efficient
service vans? These examples may seem extraordinary; it would be difficult to argue that the statute
supports such a sweeping assertion ofjurisdiction.
Yet, the assertion of authority over advertising is
no less extraordinary. Indeed, the FCC is no more
expert in fuel efficiencies or hiring practices than
they are in advertising. Simply put, a limitation
without a reasonably foreseeable end is not a limitation at all.
The questionable nature of the FCC's authority
in this area is best illustrated by the Commission's
prior experiences. 5 Despite the Act's sixty-five
years on the books, the FCC/FTCAdvertising Guidelines cite only two cases in which the Commission
has equated "practices" with advertising. 59 This
lack of precedent alone demonstrates how significant a step these Guidelines are in expanding the
reach of the Commission's authority. The first
case cited by the FCC/FTCAdvertising Guidelines is
60
the In re Business Discount Plan forfeiture order.
That 1998 decision represents the only clear assertion of Commission authority over advertising
under Section 201. Even in that case, however,
the advertising claim arose out of complaints regarding the unauthorized switching of long-distance provider-or "slamming"-an area in which
para. 4. Nowhere in the guidelines does the FTC assert any

jurisdiction. Presumably, the FTC gains its authority through
the FCC's invitation to publish 'Joint" guidelines.
54 47 U.S.C. § 201(b).
55 See FCC/FTC Advertising Guidelines, supra note 8, at

para. 4.
56 15 U.S.C. § 5711.
57 Some confuse the desire to do "good" with the authority
to do good. Such was the case with the FCC/FTC Advertising
Guidelines. See FCC/FTCAdvertising Guidelines, supra note 8, at

18.
58
See Southwestern Bell Order, supra note 39 (denying
CMRS providers request for a declaration of federal preemption over "neutral application of state contractual or consumer fraud laws").
59
See FCC/FTC Advertising Guidelines, supra note 8, at
para. 4 n.2 (citing In re Business Discount Plan, Inc., Notice of
Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 14 FCC Rcd. 340, 355-358
(1998); In re AT&T's Card Issuer Identification Cards, Letter,
7 FCC Rcd. 7529 (1992)). Both cases were within the last ten

years, and neither was appealed on this issue. As shown below, both cases are best described in terms other than as advertising complaints.
60 In re Business Discount Plan, Inc. Apparent Liability
For Forfeiture, Notice of Apparent Liability, 14 FCC Rcd. 340
(1998).
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the Commission has clear jurisdiction under 47
U.S.C. § 258. Business Discount Plan can best be interpreted as an indication that deceptive advertising that results in illegal activity may aggravate
such conduct and result in more severe FCC sanctions. Moreover, it is one thing to examine ancillary advertising as part of an investigation into issues clearly within the FCC's purview; it is quite
another to have the Commission regulate advertising qua advertising.
The second case cited in the FCCIFTC Advertising Guidelinesis even weaker. That 1992 case, In re
AT&T" is not specifically about broad-based advertising. Rather, it concerns disclosures contained in the Card Issuer Identification ("CIID")
format calling cards distributed by telecommunications carriers. 62 In its letters to cardholders,
AT&T stated that "government requirements"
mandated that AT&T issue new calling cards.
AT&T's literature also asked the customer to destroy their old card. The Commission staff determined that the letter's request could mislead consumers into destroying not only AT&T cards, but
also those marketed jointly with other carriers and
those issued by other carriers alone. 63 While the
FCC in AT&T did not find any violation of Section 201(b), a "letter of admonishment" was issued under the agency's general authority contained in Section 4(i). This section allows the
Commission to "issue such orders, not inconsistent with this Act, as may be necessary in the execution of its functions." 64 In the end, AT&T did

not squarely or rigorously address the scope of
65
Section 201's "practices" language.
As these cases illustrate, even if the FCC has recently nibbled on the edges of advertising regulation, it is quite another matter for the Commission, through these Guidelines, to enter into the
61
In re AT&T's Card Issuer Identification Cards, Letter, 7
FCC Rcd. 7529 (1992).
62
See id. at 7529.

63

See id. at 7529-30.

Id. at 7530.
Some have argued that In re Telecommunications Research and Action Center and Consumer Action Complainants v. Central Corporation International Telecharge, Inc.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 4 FCC Rcd. 2157 (1989)
[hereinafter TRAC], also supports Section 201 advertising atlthority. Yet this order was not cited by the Commission in its
Guidelines, nor did the decision reach advertising qua advertising. Rather, TRAC turned on the reasonableness of the
charged rates-an issue squarely within the FCC's authority.
See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201, 203, 204; see also TRAC, 4 FCC Rcd. at
para. 11.
64
65
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advertising-regulation arena full stride after sixtyfive years of dormancy.
Courts Have Been Reluctant to View
Section 201 's "Practices"Language to Include
Advertising

3.

The frailty of the Commission's precedent is
further betrayed by the skeptical view courts have
taken of the application of Section 201 to advertising.6 6 Although the jurisdictional issue regarding
advertising alone has never been squarely
presented, courts have examined the scope of the
FCC's advertising authority in the context of various federal preemption cases. While the legal
analyses in these cases are distinguishable, the decisions illustrate the facial weaknesses of the Commission's jurisdictional assertions. For example, a
federal district court in New Jersey concluded that
"Sections 201, 202 and 203 of the Communications Act impose no duty on common carriers to
make accurate and authentic representations in
67
their promotional practices."
In holding that claims asserting violations of
state advertising law could proceed against a carrier, the Second Circuit similarly held that "while
the [Act] does provide some causes of action for
customers, it provides none for deceptive advertisement and billing."68 That court concluded that
the Act "does not indicate a uniquely federal interest

. . .

in preventing a carrier from misrepre-

69
senting the nature of its rates to its customers."
The Seventh Circuit's message to the FTC in
Miller is equally applicable to the FCC here: "The
regulatory approach articulated by the Commission, while it may be a desirable one, is not the
one Congress appears to have adopted." 70 In sum,
the generic statutes of the FTC and the FCC do

See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
Weinberg v. Sprint Corp., 165 F.R.D. 431 (D. N.J.
1996) (emphasis added). Similarly, other courts have held
that the Act does not provide a remedy for failure of advertising to fully disclose certain components of services, or even
fraudulent advertising. See DeCastro v. AWACS, 935 F. Supp.
66
67

541 (D. N.J. 1996); In re Long Distance Telecommunications

Litig., 831 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1987).
68 Marcus v. AT&T, 138 F.3d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 1998).
69

Id.

Miller, 549 F.2d at 458 (holding that the FTC had no
authority to regulate common carriers who were then regulated by the Interstate Commerce Act). Under Miller the FTC
has no authority over common carriers' advertising, and
under the Act the FCC also lacks such authority. Id. As
Comm'r Furchtgott-Roth said in his dissent, joint statements
70
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not readily define any federal role in common
carrier advertising regulation.
4.

The Pay-Per-CallExperience

At least one recent enactment by Congress indicates that it is both aware of the FCC's jurisdictional limits and is able to alter those limits
through legislation when the need arises. When
faced with a public policy need, Congress has
given power over common carrier advertising to
the appropriate agency. In the early 1990s, the
pay-per-call industry experienced rapid growth.
Part of the growth included services that charged
large per-minute or per-call charges. Some of
these charges were not fully disclosed. To stem
concerns about these practices, in 1992 Congress
passed the Telephone Disclosure and Dispute
Resolution Act ("TDDRA") .71 TDDRA grants the
FTC authority over the advertising practices of
pay-per-call services, while granting the FCC expanded powers regarding carriers of such services. 72 This statutory scheme at least supports the
notion that Congress is aware of the common carrier exclusion and has chosen to lift that exclu73
sion only for particular services.

Pay-per-call abuses raise issues similar to the
customer concerns that the FCC/FETC Advertising
Guidelines seek to address. However, when Congress sought to solve problems created by pay-percall service advertising, it specifically assigned that
duty to the FTC, while assigning carrier regulation to the FCC.7 4 Why? Because Congress underfrom the impotent agencies cannot resolve this issue.
71 Telephone Disclosure and Dispute Resolution Act, Pub. L.
102-556, 106 Stat. 4190 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 5701,
5711-5714, 5721-5724 (1994)) [hereinafter TDDRA]. For
background on TDDRA see Scott Cooper, Technology and Competition Come to Telecommunications: Reexamining Exemptions to
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 49 ADM[N. L. REV. 963 (1997)
(giving a thorough background on the TDDRA and the au-

thority it granted). See also Christopher R. Day, Hanging Up
On Consumers: Wiy the FCC Cannot Stop Slamming In the New
Telecommunications Market, 47 Am. L. REV. 421 (1997) (explaining slamming and the lack of adequate consumer protection under the 1996 Act); William Burrington and Thaddeus Burns, Hung Up on the Pay-Per-Call Industry?; Current
Federal and Legislative Developments, 17 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
359 (1993) (describing TDDRA).
72
See TDDRA, supra note 71.
73 One need not be a scholar of the "Chevron doctrine,"
set forth in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources De-

fense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 847 (1984), to see that such an
explicit statutory exclusion likely keeps the FTC from asserting any power in the area of common carrier advertising
under Chevron Step I: "First, always, is the question whether

stood that the FTC lacks authority over pay-percall services' advertising under the "common carrier" exemption, yet the FTC has the expertise to
address advertising abuses. Thus, while Congress
gave the FCC distinct regulatory responsibilities
over carriers, it left advertising regulation to the
FTC. If the FCC already had authority over "advertising," as asserted in the Guidelines, no one, including Congress, the President and the witnesses
who testified on the merits of TDDRA, appeared
to believe that the FCC already had such authority. 75 Given this background, only an explicit statutory grant of authority over advertising regulation should permit the FTC or FCC to proceed
with the Guidelines.

In the end, the FCC's authority to promulgate
advertising guidelines is unsubstantiated. While
the FTC clearly lacks such authority, the FCC's
own precedent is quite weak and the courts have
been highly skeptical of such an assertion of Commission authority. Moreover, TDDRA contradicts
the idea that Congress intended Section 201's
"practices" to include advertising. Nonetheless, it
is possible, perhaps even likely, that a court facing
a challenge to the FCC's authority to promulgate
the Guidelines would uphold the agency's action.
Courts can and do uphold FCC rules, even if a
court explicitly notes that the rule is inconsistent
with the clearest and most straightforward interCongress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.

If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Chevron, 467
U.S. at 842-843. But see Mobile Communications v. FCC, 77
F.3d 1399, 1404, 1406 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (describing section
4(i) as the "necessary and proper clause" of the Act and holding that the FCC had "affirmative statutory support" to require a last minute payment from Mobile for a license that
would be of high dollar value if that license were sold at auction, even if the plain language of the authorizing statute exempted Mobile from the licensing fee requirements).
74 In title I, TDDRA amends the FCC's enabling statute to
apply its appropriate expertise. See 47 U.S.C. § 228. In title 11,
TDDRA amends the FTC's enabling statute to allow this limited oversight of common carrier activities. See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 5711-5714. Congress also passed Section 228 of the Act to
give the FCC additional tools to combat 900 services' abuses.
75
Otherwise the statutory authority granted in the TDDRA would have been superfluous. A better reading is that
the Commission and the F1TC previously lacked the authority

given in TDDRA. Here the agency would require a similar
grant of authority prior to any action.

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

pretation of the statutory language. 76 However,

the "follow the law" precept is not simply a matter
of whether the Commission action would be upheld by a court. Rather "follow the law" means acting well within the clearest and most straightforward interpretation of the Commission's statutory
mandate. By any measure, the Guidelinesskirt near
the edge of a most imaginative interpretation of
the FCC's statutory charge. As discussed above,

when proposed actions rely on statutory silence
for their authority, it creates a particularly high
burden to justify the proposed action on other
grounds.

III.
A.

77

THE TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IDEAL
The Principle of Transparency and
Accountability

Regulation should be transparent, accessible
and visible to ordinary Americans. It should not
be an arcane art for Washington lawyers. Citizens
should not have to go to Washington or hire highpriced specialists to have their voices heard. Further, the process that leads to policy should be
open. No one should be setting policy involving
significant public interest behind closed doors at
76
See, e.g., Texas Public Utility Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d
393, 443-444 (5th Cir. 1999) (acknowledging that "[w]hile
courts have rightly warned against using silence in a statute
to give 'agencies virtually limitless hegemony,' we are convinced that Congress intended to allow the FCC broad authority to implement this section of the Act"). The court also
stated that "[a] Ithough the best reading of the [Act] does not
authorize the agencies actions, we find the statute sufficiently

ambiguous to . . . defer to the FCC's interpretation." Id at

441-443.
77
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
78
See Press Statement Of Comm'r Harold FurchtgottRoth, In re SBC-Ameritech License Transfer Proceeding (Oct. 6,
1999) <www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Furchtgott_Roth/Statements/sthfr948.html>. As a matter of public record, these
companies and FCC staff were negotiating. But exactly what
were they negotiating? Not about the proper application of
FCC license transfer rules because, in this area, the Commission has no rules. Nonetheless these private negotiations
yielded extensive commitments from SBC and Ameritech for
"voluntary" conditions on their license transfers. No one
knows what goes on behind closed doors. See also Harold
Furchtgott-Roth, The FCC Racket, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 5, 1999)
<www.fcc.gov/Speeches/FurchtgottRoth/fccRack.html>.
79 See Testimony of FCC Comm'r Furchtgott-Roth Before
the House Committee on Commerce, Subcommittee on
Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection, The
Telecommunications Merger Review Act of 2000 (Mar. 14,
2000) <www.fcc.gov/Speeches/FurchtgottRoth/2000/
sphfr004.html> (reiterating concerns that merger conditions
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the FCC. 78 These decisions should be made with
79
full public input and discernible explanation.

Fortunately, government long ago accepted many
of these basic democratic principles of sound decision-making and adopted statutes, such as the

Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), to achieve
these goals. Agencies should be reluctant to stray
too far from these protections. Ad hoc proceedings undermine the goals of transparency, openness, predictability and accountability. For example, in "merger" cases, the financial stakes are
high, and unfortunately, the process has been at

its most opaque."" However, license transfer proceedings have not been the only forum in which
the Commission has short-changed the public and
the process.
The agency's use of "Policy Statements" rather
than rules to implement new regulatory policies is
also disturbing.8 ' By removing selected issues
from the rigors of the APA, the agency largely
eliminates the opportunity for interested parties
and the public to participate in the policy development process. These decisions also are shielded
from judicial review. Moreover, it is not clear what
regulatory goals the Commission attempts to
achieve through "Policy Statements" rather than
formal rules.8 2 In many cases, it appears that the
were being added to FCC review without public scrutiny).
80 Comm'r Furchtgott-Roth has been extremely vocal regarding the FCC's use of ad hoc procedures and closed door
meetings in evaluating license transfers-the so-called
"merger review process." Unlike the Justice Department's
merger review process, the Commission has crafted a process
that is ad hoc, unpredictable, nontransparent and virtually
inexplicable. This, of course, causes delay and confusion. See
In re Application For Consent to the Transfer of Control of
Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations from Southern New
England Telecommunications Corporation to SBC Communications Inc., CC Dkt No. 98-25 (Oct. 23, 1998) <www.fcc.
gov/Speeches/Furchtgott-Roth/Statements/sthfr858.html>
(separate statement of Comm'r Furchtgott-Roth). See also In
re Application of WorldCom Inc. and MCI Communications
Corporation For Transfer of Control of MCI Communications Corporation to WorldCom, CC Dkt No. 97-211 (Sept.
14, 1998) <www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Furchtgott-Roth/Statements/sthfr846.html> (separate statement of Comm'r
Furchtgott-Roth); In re For Consent to Transfer Control of
Teleport Communications Group to AT&T Corp. (visited
Mar. 2, 2000) <www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Furchtgott-Roth/
Statements/sthfr838.html> (separate statement of Comm'r
Furchtgott-Roth)
81 See Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237
(1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C). Notice and comment rulemaking are called for
under the APA. Consequently, informal "Policy Statements"
have no authority or standing.
82
See generally Robert A. Anthony, Pro-Ossiflcation: A
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Commission is merely trying to avoid the procedural rigors of notice-and-comment rulemaking,
while implicitly demanding licensees' compliance
with these less formally promulgated policies.
B.

Application of the Tranparency and
Accountability Principle to the FTC/FCC
Advertising Guidelines

evade judicial review because they are not strictly
"binding."8 3

Based on these factors, the Guidelines do not fulfill the agency's obligation to transparency and accountability.

IV.

A HEALTHY RESPECT FOR FEDERALISM

Unfortunately, in adopting the Guidelines the
Commission strayed from transparency and accountability. The Commission did not issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, nor did it seek comment from the public. Instead, the Guidelines
emerged in full form from the agency. No party
had an opportunity to file comments that
presented the jurisdictional issues discussed
above. No state attorneys general were able to describe the roles played by the states. No consumers were able to express their views about the
need for the Guidelines. No service providers could
share their best advertising practices. A noticeand-comment process might not have changed
the outcome. But the public would have been
able to learn that the FCC was contemplating the
Guidelines, inform the FCC of their views and have
the satisfaction of believing that their views were
taken into consideration.
The Guidelines are an oddity in administrative
law. They are not binding per se, thus a carrier
cannot be prosecuted for violating them. Nonetheless, carriers can be prosecuted for "practices"
under Section 201(b) that are not 'just" and "reasonable." The Guidelines will apparently provide
guidance to the Commission in evaluating what is
'just" and "reasonable" under the statute. Thus, in
a way, the Guidelines became binding. Yet, despite
their real world impact, these Guidelines may

A.

The Principle of Federalism and the Merits
of Decentralization

Harder Look At Agency Policy Statements, 31 WAKE FOREST L.
REV.667 (1996) (asserting that the courts' deferential view to
the legal authority of "Policy Statements" is anti-libertarian as
it takes the right to affect policy through the courts away
from the public). The author goes fuirther to suggest that the
courts, in determining whether a policy was "arbitrary and
capricious," should engage in an intensive inquiry into the
.underlying wisdom" of the policy statement and place the
burden on the agency to show its policy rests on a "foundation of logic and fact." Id. at 689-90.
83 See In Re Broadcast Equal Employment Opportunity
Enforcement Policy As To Religious Broadcasters (visited
Mar. 2, 2000) <www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Furchtgott-Roth/
Statements/sthfr807.html> (separate statement of Comm'r
Furchtgott-Roth) (describing the problems of using "guidelines" rather than valid legal standards).

See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 224, 251, 252, 271, 332.
See In re Implementation of Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Intercarrier
Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, Declaratory Ruling, CC
Dkt. 96-98, and Notice of ProposedRulemaking, CC Dkt. No 9968, FCC 99-38 (Apr. 25, 1999); see also Kasey Chappelle, The
End of the Beginning: Theories and PracticalAspects of Reciprocal
Compensationfor Internet Traffic, 7 COMMLAw CONSPEcTus 393
(1999) (reviewing the impact of reciprocal compensation
regulation).
86 States have created websites and consumer complaint
filing centers to address these issues. See, e.g., California Department of Consumer Affairs, Consumer Information Center
(visited May 21, 2000) <www.dca.ca.gov/cic>. The states have
actively pursued fraud in 'sweepstakes, pay-per-call and other
areas. Many states have distributed information on how to de-

Good regulation is not necessarily FCC regulation; in many areas, states are often in the best
position to provide the necessary regulatory oversight. The government that is closest to the people often makes better policy decisions for the
public. Consistent with this view, Congress routinely and clearly delegates some authority to the
84
FCC and reserves other authority for the states.
The Commission should defend the jurisdictional
lines drawn by Congress so that it does not intrude upon the authority of the states.
Given the Commission's discrete authority and
limited resources, the FCC should be reluctant to
interfere in areas where states and localities have
exercised their authority and implemented public
policy solutions. Yet, the FCC's power over state
issues is perhaps greater and preemptions more
frequent than they have ever been. FCC encroachment has been accomplished both by expansive
interpretations of FCC jurisdiction that only implicitly diminish state authority, as well as by explicit preemption of state authority. 8 5 The prominence of the Commission should make it
particularly cautious about expansive jurisdictional interpretations that may inadvertently chill
86
state and local oversight and control.
84
85
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B.

Application of the Federalism and
Decentralization Principle to the FCC/FTC
Advertising Guidelines

The FCC and FTC are not the only government
entities available to help consumers with advertising complaints. State consumer protection laws
and agencies are already well equipped for this
task. State and local governments also have the jurisdiction and resources to act. 7 Indeed, it appears that states have actively applied and enforced their authority consistent with consumer
interests. Therefore, it is not clear from a policy
or consumer perspective that FCC intervention is
necessary or even particularly helpful. Moreover,
FCC intervention may actually cause harm by raising questions about federal preemption of state
false advertising claims.
The federal role envisioned by the Guidelines
may not be warranted because the states have
been actively pursuing false advertising claims
against common carriers. For example, Iowa has a
criminal statute directly addressing telephone advertising issues."" As the state legislature found:
"customers of telephone services have been subjected to fraud in the sale and advertisement of
telephone long-distance and local services... It is
the intent of the general assembly to provide the
attorney general with additional remedies to address the issue of fraud in the sale of telecommunications services.'s- Similarly, the New York State
Attorney General's Office recently settled a distect fraud. See, e.g., California Department of Consumer Affairs, Consumer Information (visited May 21, 2000) <www.dca.
ca.gov/r_r/index.html>.
87 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 714 DA (West 2000); VA
CODE ANN. § 59.1-200 (West 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN.

§ 325F.69 (West 2000).
88

89

See id.; see also Southwestern Bell Order, supra note 39.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 714 D.1.

90 See Press Release from Office of New York State Attorney General Elliot Spitzer, Spitzer Seeks FairPlay Among Long
Distance Carriers (visited Apr. 12, 2000) <www.oag.state.ny.us/
press/1999/sep/sepl 3aI99.html>.
91 See IowA CODE ANN. § 714 D.1; Southwestern Bell Order,
supra note 39.

See Tenore v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc., 136 Wash.
2d 322, 328 (1998) (addressing claims under "breach of con92

tract, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and violation of the

Washington Consumer Protection Act").
93 See id. (stating that "AT&T contends this [federal] statute preempt Appellants' state law claims"); see also Fetterman
v. Green, 689 A.2d 289, 294 (Pa. 1997) (noting that despite a
general presumption of dual jurisdiction, the need to have
consistent radio frequency regulation preempted state law
tort claims). Jurisdictional disputes are not solely resolved in
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pute with Qwest over a misleading promotion involving free airline tickets. 90 In the negotiations,
the Attorney General's Office indicated it would
continue to review telecommunications advertisements and take action against those that it believed to be misleading. As illustrated by these examples, the states simply have more experience
than the FCC in addressing consumer protection
issues related to fraud, misleading claims or false
advertising. Moreover, these local enforcement
priorities are likely better attuned to local needs
than is a national program emanating from Washington.
Consumers also frequently avail themselves of
state law-based actions against allegedly false and
misleading advertising. In the wireless arena
alone, there have been at least fifty-one class action suits filed against service providers, often involving the alleged failure of carriers' advertising
to fully disclose the relevant terms of their billing
practices. 9' These complaints often incorporate
both federal and state claims.9 2 However, carriers
often argue that the Commission's primary jurisdiction over wireless rates preempts the state
claims in the litigation. 93 In addressing these
claims, many courts have concluded that the "savings clause" in Section 414 of the Act 9 4 preserved
the right of parties to pursue state remedies. 95 In
light of state regulatory activity, resources, expertise and state consumer protection statutes, there
may be little need for the FCC/TC Advertising

court, however. At the Commission, the Wireless Consumer
Alliance ("WCA") recently filed a petition seeking a declaratory ruling that the states are not preempted from applying
consumer protection and other fraud laws to wireless service
providers. See In re Petition Of The Wireless Consumer Alliance, Inc. for a Declaratory Ruling on Communications Act
Provisions and FCC Jurisdiction Regarding Preemption of
State Courts from Awarding Monetary Damages Against
Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers for Violation of
Consumer Protection or Other State Laws, Petitionfor Declaratory Ruling, WT 99-263, DA 99-1458 (Jul. 15, 1999) [hereinafter WCA Petition] (calling attention, additionally, to several
other matters regarding a state's ability to impact the behavior of the industry). The FCC ruled that, as a general matter,
the Act does not pre-empt the award of monetary damages by
state courts based on state tort or contract claims. See In re
Wireless Consumers Alliance, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and
Order, WT Dkt. No. 99-263, FCC 00-292, para. 2 (rel. Aug. 14,
2000) [hereinafter WCA Memorandum Order].
94
47 U.S.C. § 414 ("Nothing in this chapter contained
shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at
common law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter
are in addition to such remedies.").
95
See WCA Petition, supra note 93.
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Guidelines.9 6 Furthermore, the Guidelines may actually harm state efforts to regulate advertising. The
mere existence of federal guidelines promulgated
under the auspices of the Act may create uncertainty regarding the preemption of state law
claims in this area. Although the FCC/FTC Advertising Guidelines assert that they "[do] not preempt
existing state law,"'9 7 they may, at the very least,

raise new questions about the viability of the state
law claims discussed above. As one district court
recently held, the savings clause of Section 414
"must be read to preserve only state claims that
address obligations different from those created by the
CommunicationsAct."98 Even if state claims are ultimately allowed, the mere fact that opponents to
these consumers may have further support for a
federal preemption defense will delay the adjudication of state law claims and increase the cost of
the litigation.9 9 Even before the FCC/FTCAdvertising Guidelines, it was clear that courts often struggle to determine where federal jurisdiction ends
and state law claims begin. 10 0 These Guidelineswill
only add to this confusion.
Almost twenty-five years ago, the Supreme
Court gave guidance for such preemption cases.
In Nader v. Allegeny Airlines,10 1 the Court allowed
state law claims to stand despite statutory language in the Federal Aviation Act giving certain
consumer protection roles to the FAA. 10

2

In Na-

der, the well-known plaintiff was bumped from his
flight to Hartford where he was to give a speech to
a consumer group.' 0

3

versy, the plaintiff refused the tender of a future
free flight and pursued a state fraudulent representation claim, as well as a federal statutory
claim. 10 4 After a decision favorable to the plaintiff
rendered by the district court, and subsequent reversal by the court of appeals, the Supreme Court
held that neither the filed rate doctrine nor the
doctrine of primary jursidction precludes an action for damages on common law fraud grounds
against an airline.

10 5

In a line of cases dating back to 1986, courts
have found that the Act does not preempt statebased claims, specifically in the case of fraudulent
or misleading advertising.10 6 The preemption premise has been most often based on the federal
"filed-rate" doctrine. Under the most common rationale for allowing the state claims, courts have
concluded that fraudulent advertising actions do
not challenge the actual rates charged, but only
the manner in which they are communicated.
Thus, the filed-rate doctrine does not protect the
carriers from these state law claims. This reasoning was recently reaffirmed in Lipcon v. Sprint
1 7
Corp. 0 Lipcon challenged Sprint's practice of
not disclosing the expiration dates on its phone
cards.108 In allowing the state claims to go forward, the court found the carrier's preemption
claim meritless and determined that any effect on
rates was "speculative at best.""'
Preemption of advertising claims against wireless carriers was raised in a 1998 Washington state

In the subsequent contro-

96 While consumer protection is sometimes required, at
other times markets may police themselves. With complete
information, the distrust engendered by disappointed consumers forces a firm to change its ways or face extinction.
97
FCC/I7TC Advertising Guidelines, supra note 8, at para.

10.

98 Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 938 F. Supp. 1158, 1168
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 138 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 1998) (emphasis
added); see also Comtronics, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 553
F.2d 701, 707 n.6 (1st Cir. 1977). Recently, but prior to the

release of the Guidelines, the Commission affirmed the availability of state claims in this area. See Southwestern Bell Order,
supra note 39.

9o Some cases have bounced back and forth between
state and federal courts through removals and remands.
100 See In re Long Distance Telecommunications Litig.,
831 F.2d 627, 633 (6th Cir. 1987) ("We believe the district

court erred in holding that the state law claims for fraud and
deceit.., were preempted by the Communications Act."); see
also Tenore, 136 Wash. 2d at 349. (holding that "[t]he matter

falls within the conventional competence of the courts without the need for referral to the FCC"). See generally DeCastro
v. AWACS, 935 F. Supp. 541 (D. NJ. 1996);); In re Comcast
Cellular Telecommunications Litigation, 949 F. Supp. 1193

(E.D. Pa. 1996); Zimny v. AWACS, 958 F. Supp. 947 (D. Del.
1997); Kellerman v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 112 Ill.
2d 428 (1986). But see Bastien v. AT&T Wireless, 205 F.3d 983

(7th Cir. 2000) (holding that Section 332(c)(3) of the Act
barred plaintiffs claim because the resulting award would
have the same effect as ratemaking).
101 426 U.S. 290 (1976).
102
See id. at 307 (stating "[p]assengers may ...pursue
their remedy under the common law").
103

See id. at 292 (surprising as it seems, apparently the

airline did not know with whom it was dealing).
104

See id. at 295.

105

See id. at 302 ("Congress did not intend to require

private litigants to obtain an [FAA] determination before
they could proceed with the common-law remedies.").
2d 428; DeCastro v.
106 See, e.g., Kellerman, 112 I11.
AWACS, 935 F. Supp. 541 (D. N.J. 1996); Zimny v. AWACS,
958 F. Supp. 947 (D. Del. 1997).
107 962 F. Supp. 1490, 1494-95 (S.D. Fla. 1997); see also
WCA Memorandum Order, supra note 93.
108 See id.
109 Id. at 1494. (stating "[t]he prosecution of these
claims will in no way interfere with the delivery of long distance telephone service to defendant's customers").
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case against AT&T Wireless Services.1 I" The parties alleged that AT&T's advertisements were misleading because they failed to disclose the practice of rounding up to the next full minute in
charges for airtime."' The court ultimately concluded that the Act's "savings clause" preserved
the state law claims.' 12 The court found that the
filed-rate exception did not apply, since wireless
providers are not rate regulated and thus do not
file rate tariffs. In rejecting preemption, the court
held that state laws provided supplemental protection against activities for which the Act did not allocate regulatory authority to a federal agency.' 13
At the end of the day, it is not clear that the
FCC/FTC Advertising Guidelines will necessarily alter the preemption analysis described above.
Nonetheless, it is clear that courts have not read
the "practices" language in Section 201 of the Act
as granting the FCC jurisdiction over advertising.
To the contrary, these preemption cases have frequently found that there is no role for the FCC in
advertising regulation. The Guidelines inevitably alter this calculus. Although the ultimate conclusion that state law claims are permitted may not
change, the Commission may have significantly
muddied the waters for consumers seeking the
protection under state consumer protection laws.
V. A ZERO SUM GAME
A.

Principle of a Zero Sum Game

Assuming that a proposed action falls within
the FCC's jurisdiction and satisfies the other
threshold criteria set forth above, it still may not
be advisable to proceed if other, more worthy activities must be forsaken to pursue a proposed initiative. Stated in more practical terms, Congress
prescribes a budget for the Commission that it believes is commensurate with the agency's statutory
mandate. In most cases, to take on new tasks, the
Commission must reallocate resources from else-

where in its budget. In economic terms, it is a
zero sum game.' "4 Funding must be taken from
one area to fund another. Therefore, new initial 10 See Tenore v. AT&T Wireless Services and McCaw
Cellular Communications, Inc., 962 P.2d 104 (Wash 1998).
111
See id. at 106.
112 See id.
113
See id. at 1]7.
114
Anyone who has ever managed a household budget
knows what the reality of zero sum budgeting entails. Simply

tives inherently contain an implicit subjective
judgment: the Commission deems a new initiative
more important than other existing or potential
programs or policies. There is no question that
the Commission's existing funding levels impact
its decision-making. The Chairman himself has recently called for expenditure reductions (through
curtailed travel and a limited hiring freeze) due
to funding concerns.'

1 5

In developing its spending priorities, the Commission should first fully fund all activities that it
is statutorily obligated to carry out. Only after
these core functions have been fully funded
should the FCC even consider branching off in
new directions where its authority is less clear. As
described above, possible Commission activities
can be thought of in four categories: (1) mandated, (2) permissible, (3) not clearly contemplated and (4) barred. Those agency actions that
are clearly required by the statute should receive
full funding before any examination of activities
in the second or third category.
Despite its resource limitations, the Commission rarely makes these hard choices explicit. Instead, especially in the case of new "initiatives,"
there appears to be little appreciation of the implicit choices at work. New initiatives almost invariably mean positive press attention without any
accountability or mention of their impact on
agency resources. Yet, new initiatives often mean
that some core statutory functions, such as interference enforcement or licensing processing, may
go unfunded or under funded. But there will not
be a press release touting the new advertising protections while at the same time adequately
describing the corresponding cuts in personnel
assigned to review the safety of cell phones. Licensing delays and backlogs, universal service assistance and development of more refined bidding processes all need support. Yet, the
Commission presses on into areas outside its mandate, where every dollar spent could have gone towards meeting goals more closely tied to the
FCC's statutory mission.

put, money spent on one activity cannot also be spent on another. For example, money spent on eating out is money that

cannot be spent on a new refrigerator. The FCC should assess its budget in the same way.

115
At this writing, the FCC continues under a hiring
freeze and a travel moratorium.

20001
B.

FCC Jurisdictional Boundaries

Application of the Zero Sum Game
Principle to the FCC/FTCAdvertising
Guidelines

Even assuming the Guidelines were supportable
under every other consideration, they do not withstand scrutiny as the most productive use of
agency resources. The FCC/FTCAdvertising Guidelines have already consumed significant resources
and likely will continue to divert attention away
from the FCC's statutorily mandated activities.
Other, more pressing, consumer protection initiatives that are more squarely within the agency's
statutory charge deserve these limited resources.
Many have asked: "How could you oppose the
FCC's protection of consumers from fraudulent
advertising?" The answer is also a question: "How
could you oppose the FCC fully staffing and funding its primary and explicit statutory responsibilities?"
The drafting of the FCC/FCAdvertising Guidelines consumed substantial resources. Interpreting
and implementing the Guidelines and their progeny will demand significant additional energy.
Moreover, the agency's current lack of expertise
will exacerbate the resource drain. Indeed, the
task of monitoring advertising of these services is
daunting in scope. Hundreds, if not thousands, of
noncarriers advertise these services. Although the
FCC does not have jurisdiction over noncarriers,
their advertising will suddenly pull these entities
within the agency's purview. Businesses and
groups, from 7-Eleven to the Rotary Club, from
Wal-Mart to the NHL, often market telecommunications services. The potential resource implications of reaching all of these possible players are
staggering.
In a period of hiring freezes and travel moratoria, the Commission should not divert resources
to advertising supervision. As set out above, inherent in this advertising initiative is the Commission's implicit decision to move resources away
116 The Commission has moved in recent years to step
up its consumer and enforcement activities. These steps include creation of the Enforcement and Consumer Informa-

tion

bureaus. The agency already has a significant docket re-

garding these issues before these new enforcement
initiatives. See Common Carrier Bureau Releases Statistics on

Telephone-Related Complaints and Consumer Tips and
Scams, Rpt. No. CC-48, Dec. 17, 1998 (finding that "[i]n
1997, CCB handled a total of 44,035 telephone related complaints"). The Common Carrier Bureau also reported the following yearly statistics: in 1997, 20,475 slamming complaints;

from other activities. Rather than deploy resources to pursue an initiative grounded in statutory silence, the Commission should deploy resources in areas where it has explicit (and often
sole) jurisdiction to protect consumers.1 1 6 For example, the Commission has clear, congressionally
mandated authority over a number of consumer
protection initiatives, including interstate obscene
and harassing phone calls, 1 7 unsolicited interstate fax advertisements, 1II slamming1 19 and radio
interference. 1 20 Too often the Commission does

not have the resources to promptly and comprehensively address consumer concerns in these
core jurisdictional areas. Indeed, a strong case
can be made that consumers would derive greater
benefits from more aggressive enforcement operations against unsolicited faxing than they would
from duplicative advertising regulation. Such prioritization seems consistent with a statute that
grants the FCC exclusive jurisdiction over unsolicited faxes, but says nary a word about FCC advertising regulation. Before the agency ventures
forth beyond its clear statutory mandate, it must
first take care of its primary statutory responsibilities. In a zero sum resources game, the Commission too often acts first and budgets later.

VI.

CONCLUSION

In looking at the four factors outlined above,
the decision to dissent from the FCC/FTCAdvertising Guidelineswas not a close call. If authorized at
all, the Commission's authority to regulate carrier
advertising is at the outer edges of its jurisdiction.
The Guidelineswere developed in a largely opaque
process without the benefit of notice and comment and without the accountability that comes
with traditional rulemaking. Even if authorized
and promulgated in an open procedural context,
the Guidelines address an area already subject to
substantial state oversight. Thus, it is not clear
1998, first half, 597 slamming complaints; 1998, 4,480 cramming complaints. See id. See also The Common Carrier Bureau Consumer Protection Branch Launches Paperless Environment, DA 97-2458, Nov. 25, 1997 (observing that there
are "over 40,000 consumer complaints about telephone service" each year).
117 See 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
I iS See 47 U.S.C. § 227 (1994 & Supp. 1997).

119
120

See 47 U.S.C. § 258 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
See 47 U.S. C. § 302 (1994).
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that federal action is necessary, and it is possible
that FCC action may actually harm state efforts via
preemption. Finally, in allocating Commission resources, there appear to be many stronger candidates for FCC attention than carrier advertising.
In the end, some may disagree about the merits
of the FCC/FTC Advertising Guidelines. That is not,
however, the most significant part of the debate.
Instead, it is essential that the Commission explicitly consider the factors set out above in its decision-making. The Commission should assess

[Vol. 8

where a given decision lies on the continuum of
its authority. Additionally, the Commission should
practice openness and accountability. The Commission is well advised to consider the role of the
states and the relative need for federal intervention. Finally, the Commission should make explicit resource allocation decisions in assessing
the utility of new initiatives. Such an open discussion of these considerations would give Congress,
industry and the public a full and clear debate on
the challenges we face and the priorities we value.

